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Abstract
Constructed four years after WWII in a kind of pendulum swing response to the Third Reich,
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was an experiment in socialism. Under the
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (The Socialist Unity Party of Germany, SED) no
East German was to go hungry, unemployment would be eradicated, housing guaranteed,
women treated as equals, and human rights interwoven into the fabric of this socialist society.
However, SED socialism in practice did not conform to this original vision and would
eventually represent the disillusionment with the socialist project as a whole.
This project seeks to understand human rights in the GDR, both within East Germany itself and
within a global context, with a particular emphasis on the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit’s (The
Ministry for State Security/Stasi) seemingly contradictory role in simultaneously maintaining
and undermining human rights within the GDR. This research draws on and expands upon
current GDR scholarship in addition to incorporating Stasi-related documents from the German
government’s online federal archives. This project was inspired by my own visit to the Stasi
Museum (the former Stasi headquarters) in Berlin. Visiting the museum and subsequent research
has revealed how the utopian political ideals of the GDR were threatened by the same institution
charged with preserving them. This paradox of violating human rights in the name of advancing
human rights remains important in the 21st century, especially in regard to the privacy vs.
protection debate so pertinent in the post-9/11 era.
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Abbreviations
BND

Bundesnachrichtendienst (West Germany’s foreign intelligence agency)

FRG

Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany), West Germany

GDR

Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic), East Germany;
established October 7, 1949 and dissolved on October 3rd, 1990.

HVA

Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (Main Directorate for Reconnaissance); subdepartment
of the MfS

IM

Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter (unofficial collaborator [of the Stasi])

KMR

DDR-Komitee für Menschenrechte (GDR Committee for Human Rights)

KPD

Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)

K-5

Kommissariat 5; precursor to the MfS modeled after the structure of the KGB

MfS/Stasi

Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security), East German secret
police; established February 8, 1950 and dissolved January 13, 1990

NSDAP

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers’
Party), the Nazi Party

PDS

Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism); successor to
the SED

SBZ

Sowjetische Besatzungszone (Soviet Occupation Zone)

SED

Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany);
formed April 21, 1946 as a result of the merger of the SPD and KPD; the ruling party
in the GDR from its founding until its dissolution

SMAD

Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (Soviet Military Administration in
Germany)

SPD

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)

UDHR

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, published by the United Nations December
10, 1948
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Introduction
On January 15, 1990, tens of thousands of angry East Germans stormed the secret
police’s headquarters in Berlin. The East German Ministry for State Security (MfS/Stasi) created
files on nearly 5.6 million individuals during its forty years in existence. 1 At its height, the
ministry had 91,015 employees, or 1 MfS employee for every 180 East German citizens.2 The
Stasi was notorious for its invasive surveillance network that collected information on GDR
citizens through wiretapping, breaking into apartments while residents were away, 3 opening
mail, and photographing individuals, often through cameras hidden in everyday objects such as
bird boxes, watering cans, and neckties. 4
The protestors were angry because of
recent news that the PDS-led government had
intentions of restructuring the Stasi, not
disbanding it. Demonstrators also feared that
the ministry would attempt to destroy its files
and other incriminating evidence before the
true extent of the surveillance network could
ever be revealed. Signs and banners were

East Germans storm the Stasi Headquarters on January 15, 1990.
Photo taken from https://www.dw.com/en/stasi-hq-storming-german-presidentpraises-democratic-act/a-52009115

Cathrin, Schaer, “The World from Berlin: Stasi Files Reveal East Germany’s ‘Dirty Reality,’” Spiegel
International, July 10, 2009, https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-stasi-files-revealeast-germany-s-dirty-reality-a-635486.html.
2
Jens Gieseke, The History of the Stasi: East Germany’s Secret Police, 1945-1990, Translated by David Burnett,
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2014) 49.
See also Figure 1.7 for more information on MfS employee numbers.
3
See Figure 1.8 for more information.
4
Victoria Woollaston, “Cameras Disguised Inside Coat Zips and Bugs Hidden in Tree Trunks: Fascinating Insight
into the Crafty Tricks and Devious Gadgets German Spies Used During the Cold War,” Daily Mail, September 17,
2013, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2423361/Crafty-tricks-devious-gadgets-German-spies-usedCold-War-revealed.html.
1
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displayed outside of the headquarters proclaiming opposition to “Stasi and Nasi.”5 Not everyone
wanted to safeguard the information collected on East Germans, however. Some protestors
wanted to destroy the Stasi files, asking those who had stormed the building and were taking the
materials away “Are you the new Stasi?” 6
This split reaction among protestors in the heated moments of breaking into the Stasi
headquarters would be echoed just months later as a reunified Germany began to question how to
deal with East Germany’s past. If the files were allowed to fall into the hands of the Federal
Archives, many feared that former East Germans’ dirty laundry would flood headlines and smear
campaigns of former Stasi officers would be commonplace for years to come. 7 On the other
hand, the destruction of the files would be a catastrophic loss to historical research, and the
lessons from a failed regime would go up in flames.
Central to this debate was an ethos of injustice. Those who felt they had been wronged
wanted to see their perpetrators punished. Many former employees of the Ministry for State
Security, however, struggled to come to terms with the anger unleashed against them as they
grappled with the realization that Germany’s experiment in socialism had failed. The same
ideology that many had believed was the only hope for utopia on earth was now being termed
“the Lie.”8 Certainly, individuals joined the MfS for reasons other than ideological alignment,
but former head of the Stasi’s foreign intelligence unit (HVA) Markus Wolf compared the fall of

“Nasi” was the shortened version of the proposed Office for National Security designed to replace the Stasi.
“The Storming of the Stasi Headquarters,” German History in Documents and Images, January 16, 1990.
https://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=2982.
7
This was, to some extent, true. One of the most famous examples is the December 1990 case of Lothar Maiziere, a
former GDR citizen running a political campaign that abruptly ended when news of possible ties to the Stasi was
released. More information can be found at
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1990/12/18/145790.html?zoom=14.790000000000001&pageNum
ber=3.
8
Markus Wolf and Anne McElvoy, Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster.
(New York: Times Books, 1997), 58.
5
6
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the Berlin Wall to “being awakened from the dream.”9 Wolf’s language describing an
involuntary realization of wrongdoing in 1989 rather than admitting he was knowledgeable of his
offenses throughout his time in the MfS suggests that the perceived utopia (or Lie) of socialism
did not originate in the minds of authority figures and trickle into the general population, but was
instead a pervading presence in the fabric of the GDR.
Regardless of who had dreamt up the dream of socialist utopia, East Germany had been
forced to wake up before it could ever reach it. The ministry whose “ideological mission … was
to secure the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’” had to acknowledge that it had often harmed the
proletariat it claimed to fight for. 10 Konrad Jarausch argues that the GDR exhibited “a
problematic combination of welfare state aspirations with illiberal paternalist practices,” a
dynamic of “care and coercion” that encapsulates the GDR’s nuance in the term “welfare
dictatorship.”11 This contradiction within the state is mirrored in the Ministry of State Security
whose job it was to ensure a society for the benefit of the common man, a mission that often
manifested itself at the expense of the common man. This project argues that when forced to
choose between protecting individuals’ human rights and preserving an intangible vision of
utopia, the MfS sacrificed GDR citizens upon the altar of an idealized socialism.

9

Wolf, Man Without a Face, 58.
Gieseke, The History of the Stasi, 9.
11
Konrad H. Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, Translated by
Eve Duffy, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006) 47-65.
10
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On Historicizing the Former German Democratic Republic
Conceiving of East Germany
Though over thirty years defunct, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR/East
Germany) is still finding its legs within broader history. The exact contours of the GDR are
fuzzy and still being debated among historians. Some, often those originating in the anticommunist camp, argue that the GDR was a totalitarian nightmare, inferior both economically
and morally to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG/West Germany) propped up by Western
wealth and ideology. These thinkers are wont to argue that the GDR’s collapse was inevitable
because of its impossible to maintain pecuniary habits and corrupt methods of securing power.
On the other hand, others conceive of the former GDR through a lens of nostalgia
(sometimes termed Ostalgie, a portmanteau combining the German words Ost - meaning East and Nostalgie - meaning nostalgia). Though those with this understanding of the GDR don’t
necessarily wish to return to the proverbial “good ol’ days,” they do choose to paint East
Germany as an admirable experiment in socialism that provided unprecedented opportunities to
its citizens, but ultimately failed in its ability to deliver on its promises.
The truth lies somewhere within this (false) binary, the state itself posing a contradiction.
Terms such as “participatory dictatorship,” 12 “modern dictatorship,”13 “Unrechtsstaat”
(illegitimate regime),14 “Diktatur des Proletariats” (dictatorship of the proletariat), 15 and
“welfare dictatorship,”16 among others, have been used to describe the multifaceted structure and

Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker, (Bodmin: Yale University
Press, 2008), 1-22.
13
Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience, 17-26.
14
Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience, 48.
15
Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience, 50.
16
Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience, 47-69.
12
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society of the GDR. This lack of consensus in conceptualizing former East Germany led satirist
Peter Ensikat to ask, “Did the GDR exist at all?” 17
There is much at stake in this academic debate, a fact that, though not unique to GDR
scholarship, still weighs heavily on the minds of historians. Indeed, the ideological Cold War
first played out in historical events has made its way into the battleground of academia, where
historians’ conclusions will finally seem to suggest whether capitalism or communism won - or
at least did not fail - in the experiments of the twentieth century. The search for a complete
narrative is thus marred by countless biases, only made stronger by polemic terms so ubiquitous
they’ve become meaningless such as ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘socialism.’
East Germany’s first oral historian, Wolfgang Herzberg, noted a similar difficulty when
attempting to establish a ‘true’ history from East Germans’ conflicting experiences and
memories of the state they lived in. Herzberg’s realization of the malleable nature of reality
prevented him from being able to analyze the past at all:
I tried to write a dissertation. But I was not sure whether I was a scientist or an
artist. I did not have the courage to give my work a title … I went to a
psychotherapist and said ‘I must write this dissertation.’ And he told me I should
write small sections. I said ‘I can’t.’ Because I always asked myself what
happened in reality … Then I tried to write another dissertation … I had great
difficulties. I couldn’t do it. Again I went to see a psychotherapist. ‘Help,’ I said,
but he could not help.18
Similar to the commonly quoted adage that “statistics can be made to say anything,” it is
possible to think that history can be written to say anything. As is obvious through the
controversial and inflated propaganda that surfaced in the Cold War, a wide-ranging
(even conflicting) set of experiences can emerge from the same reality. Molly Andrews

17

Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience, 9.
Molly Andrews, “One Hundred Miles of Lives: The Stasi Files as a People’s History of East Germany,” Oral
History 26, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 24-31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40179468.
18
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argues in “One Hundred Miles of Lives: The Stasi Files as a People’s History of
Germany,” that even those Stasi employees and collaborators whose sole responsibility
was to track and understand the lives of East Germans, “were never able to capture the
essence of the lives they observed;” instead, they “were blind to the reality which they
confronted because it differed from what they thought they would find.” 19
Whatever one may think they will find inside East Germany’s Ministry for State
Security is likely an incomplete picture. In the sea of possible interpretations of the East
German MfS, this project seeks to anchor itself in the truth by focusing on first-hand
accounts of former East Germans. This emphasis on lived experience in dialogue with
other primary sources such as newspapers, photographs, and the Stasi files themselves is
the clearest way to understanding the contradiction of the welfare dictatorship.

19

Andrews, “One Hundred Miles of Lives,” 29.
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Historiography
In order to establish the Stasi’s role in East German history, this project has
combined two subfields of GDR history that have previously intersected very rarely: that
of the semantics of naming East Germany in accordance with ‘real existing socialism,’
and human rights within the Eastern Bloc.
Despite the field of East German history being a relatively new one, there is
substantial research suggesting varying models of conceiving of the GDR. Mary
Fulbrook is an essential voice in the debate, offering a people’s history of the GDR in her
book The People’s State. In her book, she argues various ways that historians must
rethink the narrative of East Germany. First, Fulbrook argues that the term ‘participatory
dictatorship’ is the best descriptor of the GDR because “of course it was a dictatorship.
But it was not only a dictatorship.”20 She rejects the application of the term
totalitarianism to the GDR because it “does not capture adequately the empirical realities
of life in the GDR.”21
Jürgen Kocka has also pointed out that the term totalitarianism, especially within
German discourse, has developed multiple meanings, rendering the word less effective as
a description of the state. Kocka describes the two widely accepted definitions of
totalitarianism: the first originating in Hannah Arendt’s philosophy and the second
coming from the tradition of Nietzsche or Brzezsinski.22 According to Arendt, Kocka
argues, totalitarianism leads to the destruction of a state which the state itself has caused.
Kocka claims that this definition can be applied to Germany under Hitler or the USSR

Fulbrook, The People’s State, 11.
Fulbrook, The People’s State, X.
22
Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience, 23.
20
21
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under Stalin but does not encompass the realities of life in the GDR. The second
definition of totalitarianism entails “attempts at or the relative success of efforts to
control and plan all areas of life,” a definition that aligns more closely with the GDR. 23
For this reason, Kocka supports the use of the term ‘totalitarian dictatorship’ as the best
description of East Germany.
This project prefers the term ‘welfare dictatorship’ because of its implications of
the inherent contradiction within the state’s goals and actions. It also fits well with
Fulbrook’s term “consumer socialism” to define the East German economy. The GDR
was not a classless society, and it was far from Marx’s idealized communist society.
Under consumer socialism, Fulbrook states, “the individual pursuit of the fulfilment of
everyday hopes and needs took precedence over collective projects and idealistic plans
for the future.”24 Individuals, then, were less concerned with utopian ideals than
surviving life in the present. By contrast, Fulbrook asserts that the SED’s “visions of
utopia could only be pursued against the will of the majority of the people.” 25 These
conflicting forces – the people of the GDR working for today and the state working for
tomorrow – created the largest source of tension within the welfare dictatorship.
On the topic of human rights, professor of European History at the University of
California, Los Angeles Lynn Hunt provides a key source of dialogue. In her book Inventing
Human Rights: A History, she suggests that the widespread concern of human rights began with
the French and American Revolutions in the 18th century. Hunt states that the most important
documents in shaping modern human rights discourse were the United States Declaration of

23

Jarausch, Dictatorship as Experience, 23.
Fulbrook, The People’s State, 12.
25
Fulbrook, The People’s State, 23.
24
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Independence (1776), the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In her construction of human rights history,
Hunt asserts that such rights must have three qualities: they must be natural (“inherent in human
beings”), they must be equal (“the same for everyone”), and they must be universal (“applicable
everywhere”).26 Hunt goes on to say that these three qualities alone are not enough, but that
“human rights only become meaningful when they gain political content. They are not the rights
of humans in a state of nature; they are the rights of humans in a society.” 27 Hunt thus suggests
the necessity of a constant striving in human society towards achieving and maintaining
widespread political recognition of the individual’s perceived inherent rights. This political
struggle is a consistent one across large swaths of geography and time.
It is, in fact, this very struggle that Professor of History at Yale University Samuel Moyn
in his book The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History seeks to understand. In contradiction to
Hunt’s history, Moyn argues that the modern-day conception of human rights did not originate in
the French or American Revolutions, or even in the post-WWII creation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, but in the decade following 1968. It was the destruction of utopia whether communist, capitalist, or otherwise - that sparked a widespread disillusionment with the
state’s ability to espouse and protect human rights. The unfulfilled promise of utopia that was
supposed to naturally follow nationalist or communist political revolution led many to believe
that an ideal society could not be forged through ideology, but could only be constructed on the
foundation of individuals’ rights.
Moyn’s work is important for its breaking away from the notion that American and
French rights formed the universal conception of human rights shared by all societies since the

26
27

Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 20.
Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 21.
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18th century revolutions. In other words, modern human rights did not prevail as the inevitable
result of a supreme intellectual discourse originating in the West, but rather as a result of failed
political utopias across the globe in which the societies who were both the assumed guarantor
and source of human rights were the main violators of those rights. Included in Moyn’s analysis
of his proposed 1970s reimagination of individual rights is the necessary acknowledgement of an
Eastern conception of human rights that diverged from the Western narrative.
Professor of European History at the University of Oxford Paul Betts argues that
insufficient research in this field of Eastern European human rights in the twentieth century has
led to the lopsided narrative depicting human rights in the GDR not as a subject in its own right,
but only in contrast to “the Western liberal understanding of these rights ideals.” 28 Betts points
out that when any attention is given to the subject of human rights in the Eastern Bloc, such
conversations largely hinge around the 1975 Helsinki Accords and its Basket III Agreements,
particularly in its relation to the genesis of grassroots civil rights movements against socialist
governments.29 In this sense, the narrative of human rights currently only begins when Eastern
Europeans ‘discovered’ Western values for themselves and fought their corrupt governments to
more closely resemble societies west of the Iron Curtain.
However, this interpretation suggests that East Germans were not grappling with issues
of human rights in the country’s nascent years, operating instead in the lawless, Wild West of
socialism before citizens finally realized their barbarism and adopted modern values. Dr. Ned
Richardson-Little, like Betts and Moyn, rejects this understanding of the GDR. Richardson-Little

Paul Betts, “Socialism, Social Rights, and Human Rights: The Case of East Germany,” Humanity: An
International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 3, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 407-426.
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/488921.
29
Betts, “Socialism, Social Rights, and Human Rights,” 407.
28
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argues that with the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification, many former East German
citizens saw the destruction of an alternative vision of human rights to the Western, capitalist
conception. The merging of the two Germanys in 1990 and the near complete adoption of West
German law thereafter meant effectively erasing any different ‘socialist human rights’ that
included women’s right to bodily autonomy or citizens’ right to work, for example.
Little research, however, has dealt with the East German secret police outside of the
context of human rights violations. Rightfully, there has been an emphasis on exposing the
invasive surveillance network watching not only perceived enemies abroad, but the GDR’s own
citizens at an incredibly high rate. What this project adds to existing research is the
understanding of the East German secret police as a (failed) tool in utopia-building.30 The East
German secret police should not be perceived as a rogue, inevitable manifestation of
communism, poisoning East German society out of malevolence (though certainly there were illintentioned actors). Instead, the Stasi must be evaluated within the context of the goals of the
SED to root out Nazism and establish a Marxist utopia. The justification of such a beast was the
hope for its ability to establish and maintain an idyllic society, the “People’s State.” 31

30

What this project is not is an East German secret police apologist text, arguing that the MfS was really a
misunderstood organization whose human rights violations were justified by pure intentions. As Gary Bruce in his
book The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi points out on p. 114: “Setting the Stasi aside in order to address a
‘positive’ aspect of the GDR such as health care can lead to a distorted view of East German history.”
31
Mary Fulbrook’s The People’s State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker compares the socialist utopia
proposed by the SED with the reality of life in East Germany. Other works dealing with this discrepancy between
the promised land and the land delivered to East Germans include Konrad H. Jarausch’s Dictatorship as Experience:
Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, Anna Funder’s Stasiland: Stories from Behind the Berlin Wall, and
Gary Bruce’s The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi.
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Structure of the Stasi
Following the German Third Reich’s unconditional surrender after WWII on May 7,
1945, the territory of occupied Germany was divided into four zones amongst the Allied powers
(the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union). In 1949, the United States,
France, and Great Britain consolidated their occupied zones into what would become the Federal
Republic of Germany, or West Germany (FRG). Similarly, the Soviet Occupied Zone (SBZ)
became the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany (GDR), that same year with the
western half of Berlin remaining part of the FRG. The division of Germany into East and West
reflected the larger ideological divide of the Cold War, a war fought to determine whether
capitalism or communism would become synonymous with human progress in the memory of
future generations. Divided Germany, and to an even greater extent, Berlin, became the backdrop
against which opposing societies of ideological experimentation clashed, becoming the literal
and symbolic arena for the future of humanity.
This simplistic understanding of the Cold War as the ultimate showdown between “East”
and “West” is faulty for a number of reasons, primarily because it touted ideology as the
dependent variable of the 20th century experiments in the formation of societies without regards
to pre-existing power structures (i.e. perhaps it wasn’t solely ‘communism’ or ‘capitalism’ that
accounted for winning or losing the Cold War, but rather a number of other factors that stacked
the cards in favor of “the West” before it began). Regardless of its merits, this perception was
widely embraced throughout the war on both sides of the Iron Curtain, making it a relevant
element of crafting a proper history of the period.
The magnitude of the Cold War and its perceived ramifications served as motivation for
both the Western and Eastern Blocs to develop extensive spy networks designed to gather

12

intelligence. In contrast to West Germany’s foreign intelligence agency
(Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND), East Germany’s Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for
State Security, MfS/Stasi) was a much more pervasive network. The MfS was designed,
however, not only to gather foreign intelligence, but also to surveil East German citizens. The
ministry ultimately wanted to eradicate enemies of the state, and deemed that such enemies were
just as likely to come from within East Germany as from abroad. 32 In fact, foreign intelligence
gathering was largely contained within a sub-department of the MfS, the Hauptverwaltung
Aufklärung (Main Directorate for Reconnaissance, HVA). Even in comparison to the Soviet
KGB, an organ designed to carry out similar aims as the Stasi and also surveilling its own
citizens, the MfS had an unimaginably large number of employees and ‘unofficial collaborators,’
(Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter, IM). The size and scope of the MfS grew rapidly over time, as is made
clear in Figure 1.8.
The Founding of the MfS
Both the MfS and its predecessor, the Soviet-established Komissariat 5 (K-5) police in
occupied East Germany, were inherently political units designed to eliminate presumed enemies
of the state. Operating under the control of Moscow after WWII, K-5 was primarily tasked with
the practical implementation of Soviet policies, governing structures, and values in the SBZ.
Functionally, this meant ‘wiping clean’ vestiges of the Third Reich, especially former National
Socialists and others who held power in the regime. Because the Soviets were wary of turning
over power to even the most devoted members of the Communist Party of Germany
(Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD), the Soviet Military Administration in Germany
(SMAD) was especially restrictive in its designation of recruits to its political police. 33 This

32
33

This assumption was cemented into the MfS consciousness after the 1953 workers’ protests.
Gieseke, The History of the Stasi, 23-28.
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exclusivity inevitably led to a police force that was especially loyal to the Soviets, and who were
eager to vigilantly carry out Soviet commands. This form of “cadre policy” in which those loyal
to the party are rewarded with positions of power within state structures and functionaries and
are thus expected to execute the party’s whims was a defining characteristic of the GDR
structure throughout its history, initially serving the Soviets and later, the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED). It is for this reason that Jens
Gieseke has termed K-5 an “auxiliary organ” of the Soviet secret police, given power and
privileges not extended to other German police units. 34
The transition from the territory known as the SBZ to the SED-controlled German
Democratic Republic in 1949, however, also represented an expansion in conceptions of political
enemies. The SED was formed in 1946 when the KPD and the Social Democratic Party of
Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) merged. The merger left many Social
Democrats upset, feeling their voices had been sacrificed at the expense of further amplifying
communist ideology. Soviet security organs sought to silence this discontent by targeting Social
Democrats, but also non-compliant bourgeois politicians and those hesitant to yield to
nationalization.35 Desires of creating a new, SED-controlled secret police to stamp out these
perceived enemies began to arise in 1948, and the party proposed a “Main Administration for the
Protection of the Economy and Democratic Order” that would replace K-5.36 Though
controversial, Stalin eventually decided to grant the Germans their own secret police, a unit that
would become the MfS. The new police were to be monitored by and report to the MGB, the
predecessor of the KGB.
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The role of the newly-created MfS was called into question in the June 1953 uprisings in
East Germany. The SED, eager to prove itself a competent power in the Eastern Bloc but also
under intense pressure from the Soviets to stay on track for the GDR’s first Five-Year Plan,
introduced its “New Course” in March 1953 and implemented it the following June. The new
economic plan called for work quotas to increase by 10%. Because the policy extended working
hours without raising wages, it was largely unpopular in the GDR, a sentiment the Soviet Control
Commission in East Germany recognized when it concluded that citizens were “confronting the
regime with increasing hostility.”37 East Germans took to the streets on June 16 and 17,
protesting the New Course and the Free German Trade Union Federation for propping up SED
policy at the expense of workers’ demands. Soviet forces violently put an end to the
demonstrations, leaving the SED and MfS with bruised egos for their inability to recognize and
contain dissent within the GDR. Historian Gary Bruce argues, however, that the MfS is often
wrongly blamed for their failure to predict the uprising, instead claiming that such predictions
were completely outside of its purview in its early years, since the ministry’s key focus was on
Western targets, not domestic ones.38 Regardless of who was to blame for failing to quell
workers’ discontent, the SED’s solution for preventing further uprisings was to expand the MfS,
resulting in the infamous and extensive network of employees and IMs committed to eliminating
political threats to the state.
According to New York Times articles published from 1959-1967,39 it is unclear whether
the American public was aware of the Stasi’s surveillance of East German citizens at the time.
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Articles with the two headlines “Mass Spying Laid to East Germany,”40 and “Red Spy Net
Reported: East German Defector Said to Tell of Wide System,” 41 give the details of the MfS
network in a sensationalist way, but never reveal information pertaining to domestic surveillance.
The former article, written in 1959, states that the MfS’s goal for the coming year according to
defector Capt. Max Heim was “penetration into the foreign policy, defense and all-German
parliamentary committees of the Christian Democratic Union.” 42 However, following the 1953
riots and the installation of Erich Mielke as the head of the MfS in 1957, the scope of the Stasi
expanded even further, a move often remembered by Mielke’s famous words “Comrades, we
must know everything.”43
An October 18, 1980 article from the New York Times, however, demonstrates
awareness of the domestic network, quoting Mielke as calling for “mass vigilance,” a phrase the
author of the article describes is “a euphemism for ordinary citizens’ spying on each other.” 44 A
September 8 article from 1990 describes a protest similar to the storming of the Stasi
headquarters that occurred in January of that year.45 East Berlin civil rights groups are quoted as
seeing “large amounts of material being hauled from Stasi headquarters by truck.” The article
being published just two months before the dissolution of the GDR, the East German Minister of
the Interior Peter-Michael Diestel claimed that “a lot of lies and fantasy flowed into [the files],”
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questioning the credibility of the information gathered. Likely aware that he would suffer greatly
if the true contents of the files came to light, Diestel attempted to undermine and discount the
wide reach of the MfS within East Germany. The following paragraph notes that Moscow had
recently announced it would grant asylum to top officials in the MfS, including to Markus Wolf,
former head of the HVA.
Though citizens of East Germany had been aware of the Stasi’s existence for decades,
they were likely oblivious to the true scope of the ministry. Regardless, by 1990 all East
Germans knew of the surveillance system that been tracking them for forty years.

Graffiti left on der Zentrale der Staatssicherheit in Berlin, 1990. The
text asks “Herr Mielke, where is my file?”
Photo taken from https://www.dw.com/en/stasi-hq-storming-german-presidentpraises-democratic-act/a-52009115
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Human Rights as Utopia
“A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even
glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always
landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better
country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias.”
Oscar Wilde, The Soul of Man Under Socialism (1895)
Many academics consider the genesis of widespread, modern conceptions of human
rights to be the era of Enlightenment and the revolutions that followed in the late 18th and early
19th centuries. Historian and professor of modern European history at UCLA Lynn Hunt asserts
that the history of human rights begins in the eighteenth century and was made possible by the
popularization of the novel. 46 Emerging fiction, Hunt argues, provided a kind of moral training
ground for conceiving of the plight of others, in turn creating a new, broader sympathy for the
common man. “A new concern for the human body” also flourished in Europe throughout this
time period, resulting in more humane forms of punishment for crimes, or the abolition of torture
entirely.47 Ultimately, in breaking with Christian tradition, Europeans in the 18th century began
to view humanity as “perfectible rather than inherently evil.” 48
The sentiment that humans were capable of progressing towards an idealized society
manifested itself in two main schools of thought during the eighteenth century: the particularistic
and universalistic conceptions of human rights. The particularistic version of human rights
presumed that “rights [are] specific to a people or a national tradition,” while universalists
claimed that human rights were the “rights of man in general.”49 The universalistic understanding
of human rights was popularized as the separation of the American colonies became more
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apparent in the 1770s, for the Founding Fathers could hardly craft their demands for
independence from Britain on the rights of freeborn British men.50 The justification for an
independent United States thus had to maintain that human rights originated in a higher power,
whether from God or a conception of natural laws that guaranteed rights transcending the
authority of the nation-state.
Constructing East German Human Rights
Yet even in the eighteenth century, not all thinkers conceded that human rights existed
outside of man and his relation to the state. English philosopher Jeremy Bentham argued that
anyone who entertained such abstract notions of human rights adhered to “the pretended law of
Nature,” and that if such rights were so obvious, “we should not need to be puzzling out the
business of ‘discovering’ them.”51 In the same way, Bentham famously proclaimed that the
understanding of human rights that promoted such broad and undefinable concepts as ‘freedom’
or ‘justice’ was not useful for man in society, but rather bourgeois “nonsense upon stilts.”52
German philosopher Karl Marx was in agreement, positing that such grandiose
proclamations of human rights was a way for elites to satisfy unruly or riotous citizens without
actually having to provide any meaningful path towards achieving such ideals.53 Marx’s
understanding of human rights as not inherent to the individual but bestowed upon the citizen by
the state was integral to the basis of human rights within the GDR. Inherent in the DNA of East
Germany was the idea that rights were “always manmade, politically determined, and something
to be conferred by the state in its effort to transform society, politics, and people.” 54 It is largely
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this break from the universalistic understanding of human rights popularized in the American
Revolution - and thus foundational to the “Western” framework of human rights - that separated
the GDR’s communist government from its Western counterparts.
The conception of utopia within the Eastern Bloc was largely rooted in what Paul Betts
describes as “economic freedom and equality.” 55 Communist thinkers centered the economy in
conceptions of human rights because it was impossible to achieve what, to them, appeared to be
abstract and superfluous rights – freedom, justice, equality, etc. – if the population did not have
equal financial opportunities. The popular understanding of communist utopia was perhaps best
described by Stalin in 1937 when he asked:
What can ‘personal freedom’ mean for the unemployed, who goes around hungry and
cannot find any application for his work capacity? Only when exploitation is overcome,
when oppression of one person by another, when unemployment, begging and fear of
finding work, bread and a place to live are no more – only then will true freedom be
found.56
The ideal communist society Stalin describes here centers economic equality as the foundation to
a flourishing society. Tangibly, this materializes in the right to work and the right to housing
within the GDR. Additionally, the GDR promoted a more progressive version of women’s rights
than the West’s – one that included equal pay for equal work at its founding in 1949 – selfdetermination, and anti-colonialism.
Though it is necessary to recognize East Germany’s understanding of human rights as a
divergence from the tradition of human rights begun in the French and American revolutions, it
is incorrect to conceive of these models as mutually exclusive. This misconception of “Western”
and “Eastern” human rights as wholly distinct is still popular today even among academics and
can likely be traced back to Karel Vasak’s November 1977 article published in the UNESCO
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Courier in which Vasak popularized the “Three Generations Theory of Human Rights.” Much
like the flawed Cold-War geopolitical model dividing the globe into the ‘three worlds,’ Vasak
proposed that the first generation of human rights was created in the West and focused on civil
and political rights, the second generation originated in the East and centered around economic,
social, and cultural rights, and the ‘Third World’ provided human rights founded in collective or
solidarity rights.57
According to Steven Jensen, the endurance and popularization of this flawed theory can
explain how modern societies, particularly those in the West who fear being compared to
Communist governments in any way, have side-lined “social and economic rights… to the
detriment of both individuals and the state.” 58 Beginning in the Cold War and extending into the
present, some countries in the West have been hesitant to promote legislation advocating for
universal housing, health care, or other social safety nets not because it is incompatible with their
supposed emphasis on ‘civil and political rights’ (in fact, such legislation might even support it),
but because it seems to suggest an unwanted tie to communist governments and ideology. This
way of thinking lends itself to “a hierarchy of rights which has nurtured analytical complacency
and over-simplification,”59 in which the human rights crystallized in the first generation of the
French and American revolutions are perceived as superior and more integral to a nation’s
success than human rights originating in the second and third generations. Legal scholar Patrick
Macklem similarly argues that Vasak’s Three Generations theory “fail[s] to appreciate what is
common to all human rights in international law.”60
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While Vasak’s Three Generations theory is lacking in nuance, it is worth recalling Hunt’s
history of human rights (and Jeremy Bentham’s criticism of his contemporaries’ attempts to
‘discover’ such rights) that depicts, in contrast to Enlightenment-era thinking, the true nature of
human rights as a product of varying societies’ values. In summary, “rights are not self-evident,
self-policing, or ethically monolithic; they are historical constructs rooted in struggle and are
even at odds with one another.”61
Defining, then, what is distinctly “Eastern” or “second generation” about human rights in
Marxist philosophy, East Germany, or the Eastern Bloc as a whole requires a critical eye not
only because of Vasak’s frequently cited yet problematic historical model, but also because of
propaganda and first-hand accounts that suggest people living during the Cold War similarly
subscribed to this flawed conception of human rights.
For example, it was necessary for one not to align too closely with the ethos of human
rights within the GDR, and certainly not with perceived Western conceptions of human rights.
Indeed, identification with human rights could be taken as an act of rebellion. East German
scholar of Marxist economics and history Jürgen Kuczynski argued that “Marx had been correct
to denounce human rights as a superfluous bourgeois concept that distracted from realising
universal justice through class struggle.”62 The notion that the fight for human rights could
become a roadblock towards progress coincided neatly with the Marxist idea that “Western
civilization” and its capitalist backbone was the antithesis of progress. In this way, what may be
popularly conceived of as Enlightenment-era human rights, or those originating in the
revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, such as those proclaimed in the United States
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Declaration of Independence or The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen and further
expounded upon in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were largely rejected by
Marxist academics in the GDR. In fact, the SED’s conception of human rights existed in stark
contrast to the West’s, as it posited that those under socialism enjoyed rights that were
“qualitatively different” and “inherently superior” to human rights found in the “bourgeois
world.”63 If any understanding of human rights was going to be accepted within the Eastern
Bloc, it needed to center the struggle of the proletariat.
Betts argues that in contrast to the West who frequently framed civil rights in the abstract,
the rights of citizens under socialism “materialized” in much more tangible ways. 64 GDR
politicians frequently cited the following section of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as the basis of rights under socialism:
Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization
of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights is impossible. The achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of
human rights is dependent upon sound and effective national and international
policies of economic and social development. 65
East German human rights, then, began to emerge as a sort of reaction to the shortcomings of
capitalist societies. Most notably, GDR activists and scholars began to latch on to and uphold
self-determination and anti-colonialism as distinctly socialist concepts.66 It is worth questioning,
then, to what degree human rights existed within the GDR as an independently conceived of and
humanitarian path towards progress, or if they prevailed merely as a way for the SED - through
groups such as the GDR-Committee for Human Rights (KMR) - to legitimize East Germany as a
state in a shifting post-war global order.
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Further, one of the key distinctions between Western and Eastern conceptions of human
rights beginning in the 1960s was the right to privacy.67 The state did not depict itself in
opposition to this right, but did highlight other topics instead, such as standards of living,
divorce, and housing, among others. Yet while the SED was distancing itself from supporting the
right to privacy for obvious reasons, the general population’s understanding of a social rights
culture began to evolve away from state-endorsed ideology. Betts describes this new occurrence
within East Germany and the Eastern Bloc in the late 1960s as the “right to have rights,” an idea
“long seen as synonymous with Western society.” 68 This emerging distinction between state and
social conceptions of human rights “provide[d] a new vantage point from which to challenge
these ‘welfare dictatorships.’”69
It was fundamental SED doctrine that human rights were something conferred by the
state and not essential to the individual (a notion that would be challenged by East Germans in
the last two decades of the GDR), yet many East German scholars disagreed about the role of
human rights within the socialist project. For example, East German scholar Robert Havemann
conceived of human rights as “the final act of the socialist revolution that would bring about his
longed-for socialist utopia.”70 In Havemann’s eyes, human rights were an essential element of
socialism that would ensure the success of the socialist society. Without them, the project could
never be complete. Others argued that human rights were somehow extraneous to the socialist
project, or only existed in order to prop up the state, claiming the “purpose of all rights is the
development and protection of socialism.” 71 These two schools of thought represent the varying
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ways in which East German academics understood the goal of the socialist experiment; to
Havemann, socialism was a tool to achieve utopia, whereas for others, socialism itself was
utopia.
Above all, the GDR maintained that peace was “that highest of human rights.” 72 This idea
of peace as the ultimate goal of the socialist project embodies the contradiction of the state;
peaceful utopia was often assumed possible to attain only through the employment of nonpeaceful methods. Further, in 1968, the International Year of Human Rights, the GDR created a
new constitution. While the KMR was framing peace as being incompatible with the West’s
“imperialist aggression,” racism, and “neo-colonial extortion,”73 the SED saw peace as
something quite different: the absence of political opponents. In other words, the SED effectively
defined peace in contrast to capitalism (inferring that human rights in the GDR meant gaining
something, such as self-determination) while also revoking their own citizens’ rights in the new
constitution by eliminating the right to strike and reducing religious freedoms.
However, unlike much of the rest of Europe in 1968, citizens of the GDR were wary of
participating in protests or solidarity movements. 74 Instead of rioting in the streets, East Germans
expressed their desires for change through writing petitions to their government. But was East
Germany’s relative peace merely a result of internalized human rights? As Anna Funder points
out in Stasiland, East Germans’ wariness to dissent was likely due to other reasons. It could be
that the Stasi was extremely effective at their job, rooting out enemies of the state at an
extraordinary rate. Also possible is the theory that East Germans were just not naturally
rebellious in nature. The relatively silent political landscape in the late 1960s, however, is most
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likely because “… alone out of all East German countries, East Germany had somewhere to
dump people who spoke out: West Germany.” 75 Prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall, East
German citizens could choose to flee to West Germany of their own accord, and often did; by
1961, around 2,000 people per day were crossing the border into the FRG. If those who didn’t
subscribe to SED politics didn’t emigrate and were instead imprisoned by the Stasi, it was
common practice for the GDR to sell its prisoners to the West. Finally, if East German dissidents
couldn’t physically emigrate, they likely suffered an ‘internal emigration.’ Such an emigration
entailed the construction of a false identity that effectively kept personal ideologies out of the
SED’s grasp because of East Germans’ fear of being discovered and punished for their true
thoughts.76

Human Rights Violations Within the GDR
The memory of the GDR is rife with human rights violations. The construction of the
Berlin Wall and the loss of the right to free movement, shootings of those attempting to cross the
border, and the far-reaching arms of the MfS in eradicating enemies of the state all frequent the
narrative of East Germany. However, it is difficult to establish what, exactly, a human rights
violation is (or was). What sets of laws or treaties are we to use as guideposts? When countries
(or say, two battling ideological camps in a Cold War) uphold different rights for their citizens,
how are we to decide who has the ultimate authority? What is the role of individual countries or
international organizations such as the UN as the global police, and how is their existence
justified? And were the universalists right? Do there exist certain human rights that transcend the
state and should be fought for regardless of what a political party or people agree for themselves?
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Did citizens of the GDR have rights not guaranteed to them by their government and the SED?
How can we seek justice from systems that never claimed to adhere to those ideals? Is retroactive
justice necessary? Is it possible?
Certainly, there are no easy answers to these questions, and an analysis of East Germany
and socialist conceptions of human rights during the Cold War will not provide them. However,
this project can inform us of the nuances of the struggle for utopia, especially when conflicting
images of that utopia emerge. The case studies included in this project focus on those human
rights violations carried out by the MfS, specifically its use of torture and psychological warfare
known as Zersetzung and its extensive surveillance of GDR citizens.
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Life in the Welfare Dictatorship
The Case of Gilbert Radulovic
In 1980s East Germany, writing about punk rockers was enough to put you in jail. Such
was the case in September 1985 when East German citizen Gilbert Radulovic was sentenced to
two years and two months when he was found guilty of “illegal establishment of contact” and
“public defamation of state organs” after writing a booklet entitled “Reminder of a Youth
Movement: Punk.”77 1985 wasn’t Radulovic’s first run-in with the East German secret police,
however. As a student, Radulovic was expelled from his philosophy studies at Karl Marx
University in Leipzig in 1970 after being accused of maintaining a “negative political-ideological
attitude,” and moved shortly thereafter to East Berlin where he became an insurance officer.
During his time in East Berlin, however, the young Radulovic refused to give up his love for
philosophy, beginning a group with ten friends known as the Thursday Circle. The circle,
identified by the Stasi as a “hostile-negative group,” discussed a number of cultural topics,
ranging from art and literature to politics and science. Among all those involved in the group, the
Stasi was most alarmed by Radulovic who they considered “one of the most negative
individuals” in the circle, and who they believed was engaging in “anti-state agitation,” a crime
according to § 106 of the criminal code in the GDR.
The MfS’s concern for Radulovic’s perceived hostilities toward the SED - and therefore,
the socialist project - led the Stasi’s Department 2 of Main Department XX to launch control
operation (OPK) “Kopernikus” in 1979 to surveil Radulovic. Working for the MfS since 1957
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and tasked with prosecuting “subversion” as a part of Main Department XX, Captain Willi
Marquardt spearheaded the attempts to find evidence of Radulovic’s supposed crimes. In 1980,
however, OPK “Kopernikus” was terminated because the MfS was unable to find any
incriminating evidence that would prove Radulovic’s alleged crime of “anti-state agitation.” The
Thursday Circle was also dissolved following the Stasi’s successful infiltration of the group.
Unaware that the MfS had ever begun surveilling him, Radulovic continued to engage in
potentially risky behaviors, including interviewing a group of punk-rockers in order to
understand their alternative lifestyle (a lifestyle condemned in the GDR as being “westerndecadent”). The interviews began in the summer of 1982 and by 1984, Radulovic had compiled
the booklet that would eventually put him in jail. Radulovic asked one of his coworkers to print
100 copies of his booklet so that he could distribute them among his friends and family. Because
Radulovic’s mother was a pensioner, she was able to travel freely between East and West
Germany, giving Radulovic the opportunity to send his new booklet to the FRG. On January 17,
1985 he gave his mother copies of the booklets, each in an addressed envelope to be sent in the
mail within West Germany. His mother sewed the booklets into the seats of her car in an effort to
hide the texts from the border guards; however, at the border crossing, the booklets were found,
and she confessed that her son had written them. The writings were enough to constitute
“subversive writing directed against the GDR,” leading the Stasi to launch a new control
operation monitoring Radulovic known as OPK “Schreiber” (German for “author”). Similar to
OPK “Kopernikus,” OPK “Schreiber” was designed to gather the evidence necessary to convict
Radulovic of his supposed crimes. In this instance, the Stasi had to work to prove that Radulovic
was the true author of the booklets. Enough time had passed since his mother’s attempted border
crossing that Radulovic had begun to believe that the Stasi would not pursue his case. However,
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after surveilling him for the entire day of March 27, 1985, Stasi agents dressed in civilian
clothing picked Radulovic up as he was leaving work in order “to clarify a matter.” Radulovic
was taken to Magdalenestraße for interrogation shortly thereafter. Following his initial
interrogation - during which he confessed to being the author of the booklet, but having no
intention of subversive activity against the state - Radulovic was taken to the detention center in
Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, the site of a former Soviet camp and industrial kitchen turned into the
Stasi’s central prison that housed political enemies of the GDR.
As part of the psychological torture frequently employed by the MfS to subdue perceived
enemies of the state (a technique known as Zersetzung, German for “decomposition”), Radulovic
was interrogated 40 times before his trial, being forced to repeat the same details of his case
again and again so that the interrogator might find inconsistencies in his story. During his pretrial
interrogation, Radulovic was forced to draw a floorplan of his apartment, clarifying where he
kept his notes not included in his final version of the booklet, further helping the Stasi collect any
potentially damning evidence against him when they broke in and confiscated a plethora of
materials including writings, books, and newspapers (Figure 1.3). The Stasi also seized
Radulovic’s typewriter, which was later used to prove Radulovic was the author of the punk
booklet by matching the typeface of the typewriter with that used in the original draft (Figure
1.4).
Radulovic was released from prison early, living the rest of his life as a GDR citizen in
careful compliance with the law and offering no reason for the MfS to think he would repeat his
earlier offenses against the state. After the reunification of Germany, Radulovic changed his
name to Gilbert Furian and has worked as a tour guide in the memorial center at BerlinHohenschönhausen (where he was initially detained prior to his trial) since 1998. It is difficult to

30

maintain that any victim of the MfS suffered less than others, but Furian later wrote that “Since
the beginning of my pretrial detention, I had instinctively immersed myself in a kind of daze to
prevent ‘them’ from taking control of my feelings, too. Thanks to this I was released from
prison, after serving half of my sentence, without suffering any major mental harm.”78 He was
also relieved, upon reading the files the Stasi collected on him, to find that no close family
member or friend had been secretly working for the Stasi and divulging his personal life to the
ministry, a form of betrayal that frequently surfaced once former GDR citizens were allowed to
access their own files after reunification. He noted that while reading his files, “Sometimes I had
to laugh out loud at the banalities that had taken on the grotesque appearance of importance by
being recorded in the files.”79 Such “banalities” can be seen in the Stasi’s photo report compiled
for OPK “Schreiber,” which features a number of photos taken of Furian living his day-to-day
life walking down the street or waiting in front of a residential building (Figures 1.5 and 1.6).
Despite claiming not to have suffered “major mental harm” while being detained and
serving his sentence, nor dealing with the trauma of being spied on by a loved one, life certainly
wasn’t easy for Furian. He describes that the worst part of his experience wasn’t his time in
prison, but his trial: “For me, this was the worst humiliation of my life - the helplessness and lack
of rights of GDR citizens, something we managed to ignore in normal everyday life, were cruelly
laid bare.”80
It is this lack of rights within the GDR identified by Furian that encapsulates the
contradiction of the welfare dictatorship. Furian’s attempts to understand the experiences of
other East Germans made him an enemy of the state because it called into question the authority
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of the SED. In Furian’s case, being a subversive element meant questioning how GDR citizens
survived in the day-to-day, and not advancing their role in the larger socialist narrative. This
tension is the same one identified by Fulbrook’s “consumer socialism,” identifying the aims of
the common man and the aims of the state as inherently incompatible.

The Case of Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler
Born into a well-to-do family in 1918 Berlin, Karl Eduard von Schnitzler lived through
the entirety of the Weimar Republic, WWII, and East Germany. His family had always occupied
elite circles. Karl Eduard’s father, Julius Edward Schnitzler, was Emperor Wilhelm’s consulgeneral in Antwerp, and served as a lieutenant in the Prussian military. Julius and his two
brothers were granted nobility in 1913, adding ‘von’ to their surname. A cousin of Karl Eduard
served as Hitler’s banker, and another cousin was the sales director at IG-Farben, the company
supplying concentration camps with Zyklon B. 81
Karl-Eduard, however, became increasingly enthralled with communist ideology as a
teenager. He fought in Hitler’s army, but eventually found himself in a British POW camp
creating news in German for the BBC. His radical ideology didn’t sit well with the British,
however, and he left for the SBZ in 1947. Von Schnitzler today is remembered largely because
of his work with “Der Schwarze Kanal,” or The Black Channel. During his segment, von
Schnitzler presented events occurring in the West, but through a radically communist filter
bordering on parody. A commentator on politics and culture, von Schnitzler had plenty to say
about East German society, as well:
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The politics of ‘freeing those in the Eastern Bloc’ is code for liquidating the GDR,
and that means civil war, world war, nuclear war, that means ripping apart families,
atomic Armageddon - that is inhumanity! Against that we have founded a state!
Against that we have erected a border with strict control measures to stop what went
on during the thirteen years that it was left open and abused - that is humane! That is
a service to humanity!82
Though the SED at the beginning of the construction of the Berlin Wall crafted the narrative
that the wall existed to keep evil, imperialistic forces outside of East German society, it was
clear that the wall was an attempt for the SED to keep East Germans from fleeing the
country. Explaining why around 2,000 people a day were leaving the GDR was a much more
complicated task than using capitalism as a convenient scapegoat. 83 However, the SED’s
insistence that the wall was a defensive measure was a thinly veiled attempt at saving face
among its own citizens. It is, therefore, shocking to see someone occupying the upper
echelons of GDR hierarchy so dedicated to an ideology he should theoretically understand to
be propaganda. Von Schnitzler expanded upon his remarks, saying that not only was the
building of the wall humane and “an historical necessity,” but that “the killings at the border
[were] an act of peace.”84 This conception of peace demonstrates what “that highest of
human rights” looked like in practice. 85 To von Schnitzler, the morality of the border killings
should be overlooked because they were carried out in pursuit of the greater goal – the
socialist human right – to peace.
Von Schnitzler’s remarks reinforce the notion that the end justifies the means, but
Funder calls into question during his interview an obvious fact about the history of the GDR
von Schnitzler seems to have forgotten: it failed. The ‘end’ was never realized, and the East
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German utopia only ever existed in the heads of its ideological leaders. Funder states that
“there was a serious attempt to build a socialist state, and we should examine why, at the end,
that state no longer exists. It’s important.” 86 Funder’s seemingly obvious claim seems to
answer the question: “was it worth it?” with a resounding ‘no.’ East Germans suffered
countless human rights violations and socialist utopia was never achieved. Von Schnitzler
would likely respond that it wasn’t the fault of the GDR that its goals were never realized,
but it was the intervention of the imperialist forces in the West that destroyed the GDR. An
inherent follow-up question to von Schnitzler’s presumed response would be “What if the
GDR had succeeded?” What if, according to whatever established socialist metric, real
existing socialism had turned out a success? Would historians even know of the Stasi files
and the true extent of the network? Or would that all have been swept under the rug and
never subjected to the distinctly German process of dealing with the past known as
Vergangenheitsbewältigung? It is hard to say that the Stasi must answer for its human rights
violations but that the ‘winners’ must not without risking hypocrisy.

The Case of Hagen Koch
Hagen Koch was Secretary General Honecker’s personal cartographer, and who painted
the future of Germany when he decided where the Berlin Wall would be erected. 87 Koch
describes that he grew up believing in the GDR, as if the spirit of the state were a religion. There
was a necessary leap of faith required to believe in heaven (and hell) as it appeared in the gospel
of the SED. Well-versed in the teachings of Marx, Koch viewed his work within the MfS as
adjacent to ensuring that one’s neighbor had heard the good news. The difference between the
doctrines of Christianity and communism, however, were that “God could see inside you to
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reckon whether your faith was enough to save you. The Stasi could see inside your life too, only
they had a lot more sons on earth to help.”88
The problem with ensuring the conversion of East German citizens to SED policy was
that another religion had recently ravaged the country: Nazism. Though it is true that such a
dividing line had arisen in German history after 1945 that “easterners did not feel then, and do
not feel now, that they were the same Germans as those responsible for Hitler’s regime,” the
SED had no way of knowing how devout their new followers would be. As it turns out, breaking
from Germany’s Nazi past through the new socialist state created a convenient guise of
innocence that many East Germans were eager to wear. In the GDR’s early years, at least, many
East Germans were anxious to leave the past behind by throttling themselves into the future.
Some of the subsequent hesitancy, it seems, was in how similar the SED’s chosen methods of
manifesting ideology looked to the previous regime. Koch remarked that “ …the Free German
Youth and the Hitler Youth were so similar that only the colour of the neckerchiefs distinguished
them.”89 What separated the two in the mind of Koch, then, was the effectiveness of SED
propaganda aimed at “ … stop[ping] the American beetle.” 90 Like the devout Musterknabe he
was, Koch believed the propaganda preached to him, including the story that Americans sprayed
potato beetles on East German crops when they flew over in their planes. When he asked why he
believed this to be a credible story, his response was “Because [the Americans] had just bombed
Dresden flat! …And they even dropped two atom bombs on Japan! They were clearly truly evil!
What more proof do you need?... I am telling you how propaganda works! That is how I grew
up.”91 In Koch’s mind, then, working for the Stasi was fulfilling the mission to eradicate evil
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American capitalism. Like von Schnitzler, Koch likely viewed his work in regards to the ultimate
peace he was attempting to build. Where one might argue that he had violated multiple human
rights during his work with the MfS, Koch would say that his actions were ensuring the human
right to peace for all.

The Case of Rolan Gandt
Amongst the East German secret police, Romeo and Juliet was not the Shakespearean
story upheld as a romantic ideal, but a form of manipulation necessary to gain key insights on
NATO intelligence - the tragedy in its truest sense. Rolan Gandt, “a king of melodrama,” was
one such Romeo, or a Stasi agent assigned to seduce high-ranking women within NATO
countries, and Margarethe Lubig was his targeted Juliet. 92 Lubig worked as an interpreter at
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), NATO’s command center. After a
romantic getaway in Vienna with Gandt, Ludwig agreed to feed secrets to Gandt when he told
her that he worked for Danish military intelligence. After having slept multiple times with Gandt,
Lubig admitted to him that she felt guilty for the affair and wanted to confess to a Catholic priest
for her wrongdoings.
Markus Wolf, head of the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance (HVA) in the Stasi and
Gandt’s supervisor, was made aware of Lubig’s guilty conscience and knew he would need to
make a priest out of one of his agents, and quickly. A suitable man for the job was found, and he
took a crash course in conducting a confession in Danish. Wolf, meanwhile, located a small
church rarely used on the Jutland peninsula, and slipped his newly minted priest into the
confessional. Margarethe told him of her inner turmoil, and he responded that she should keep up
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the work gathering intelligence because it would benefit Denmark. She bought the ruse and
continued to inform Gandt until he was assigned to another operation.
Forced into a confession of his own after the fall of East Germany, Wolf was frequently
asked if he felt bad for routinely hurting innocent individuals like Margarethe in his hunt for
Western intelligence. He responded, “ …the honest answer would be no. In retrospect, some
things did get out of hand, but at the time we believed that the end justified the means.” 93
Was Wolf, then, a Machiavellian tyrant? And what was the ‘end’ he sought to justify?
Wolf describes that “We wanted to purge our own people of their Nazi past and believed
wholeheartedly that the socialist ideas in which we had been reared could cleanse and renew
Germany.”94 This noble goal – the desire to defeat Nazism and never to allow such an evil to
take root again – led its way to a production of its own evil: the destruction of human rights
within East Germany. Yet Wolf would not have seen his role in the MfS in this way. In Wolf’s
mind, he was paving the way to a more equal society in which all people had the means and
opportunities to live fulfilling lives. This ‘purge’ was, to Wolf, the necessary ‘reset’ of society
before peaceful utopia could flourish. Wolf would likely argue he was working to create a
society in which the human rights to work, to housing, and to equal pay for equal work (among
others) were the basis of society.
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Conclusion
This paper addresses the need for additional analysis of the East German Ministry for
State Security’s dual role in buttressing and undermining the human rights ideals of the SED
within the GDR. The section of this paper entitled “Human Rights as Utopia” addresses the flaws
of conceiving of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ human rights as separate entities under the Three
Generations model while also recognizing that both the Western and Eastern Blocs saw
themselves as fundamentally different from one another. This section also deals with the growing
discrepancy between state and social conceptions of human rights within the GDR beginning in
the 1960s, and how the general East German population’s slow divergence from state ideology
(especially following the Helsinki Accords) is often conceived of as a success because of its
perceived alignment with Western values.
The conflict between state and social human rights conceptions is best illustrated by the
case studies in which Gilbert Radulovic was imprisoned for his ideals while Karl-Eduard von
Schnitzler, Hagen Koch, and Rolan Gandt (all employees of the Stasi) doled out state-sponsored
punishment in alignment with their ideals.
Employees of the MfS, serving as a link between state and social values, often found
themselves in an environment of tension between conflicting realities, but generally championed
the SED’s vision of future utopia over the SED’s proclaimed concern for the well-being of the
proletariat, a concern often overlooked in the day-to-day operations of the socialist state.
In this failed socialist experiment, the question “who was right?” is somewhat easy to
answer. Both the history books and the popular narrative of East Germany have condemned the
Stasi as a nefarious tool of governmental control and manipulation. It is less obvious, however,
how to judge conflicting conceptions of human rights in the present-day. Whose utopia deserves
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to be realized and which (if any) groups’ actions are actually a necessary evil to the construction
of societal paradise?
Molly Andrews provides a framework for judging such motivations as just or unjust by
identifying two main faults of the SED and Stasi. First, Andrews argues that the Stasi’s lack of
consent in its surveillance of East Germans “is important not only for ethical reasons, but also as
a factor to be considered when evaluating the quality of the data.”95 The consent of the governed
would have meant the legitimization of the ministry. Without the people’s will, it is difficult to
argue that the Stasi was acting in the people’s interest. Civilians’ consent to being monitored
(and having a viable option to say no and still be able to maintain a quality of life comparable to
those who agreed) is a necessary component to the eradication of the ‘dictatorship’ element of
the welfare dictatorship.
Second, Andrews writes that “The purpose of data collection was very specifically tied to
the interests of the state, and this informed every aspect of the work.” 96 In this instance ‘the
interests of the state’ are conflated to furthering an unrealistic, theoretical conception of socialist
utopia, not the people’s will. This lack of transparency allowed the SED to advance its goals
without recognizing its tangible impacts on East German citizens’ lives.
Though the Stasi within East Germany could be compared to any number of
governmental agencies operating within present-day countries (including notable examples west
of the former Iron Curtain), especially after an increased interest in intelligence-gathering
following the September 11 attacks, it is also useful to consider how the lessons of the GDR
might expand outside of governments and into corporations. Harvard professor Shoshana
Zuboff’s book Surveillance Capitalism is an analysis of big-data collection by companies
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seeking to understand modern consumers’ behavioral patterns. Zuboff’s work suggests that the
human rights discourse usually contained to governmental structures should expand into
heretofore poorly regulated powers of corporations. By further expanding and refining Molly
Andrews’ proposed framework of analyzing corrupt surveillance practices, scholars can
meaningfully engage with similar surveillance systems, promoting long-term social stability and
centering human rights at the forefront of future discussions.
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Appendix
Figure 1.1

Punk-rocker in front of the text “No one does what they should – everyone does what they want”
In 1982, Gilbert Radulovic began interviewing punk-rockers through his contacts with the protestant
church in an attempt to understand the groups’ rejection of mainstream values within the GDR. Nikolaus
Becker accompanied Radulovic to take photos of the interviewed individuals. Whenever Becker heard
that Radulovic had been arrested, he scratched out the faces of the individuals in the photos in order to
protect their identity in possible future investigations.
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Figure 1.2

The first page of the “Maßnahmeplan zur OPK Schreiber,” or the action plan for the surveillance and
control of OPK “Schreiber”
The complete version of this document, compiled by Stasi staff member Gerd Staedtler on February 1,
1985, shows a twelve-step plan to find the evidence necessary to prove Radulovic’s role as the author of
the “subversive” punk booklet. Not only does it detail how to effectively surveil Radulovic, but also what
pieces of information OPK “Schreiber” must produce in order to convict Radulovic of his crimes. The
first bullet point underneath section number 5, for example, asks “Which copy machine was used to
produce the materials [the booklets]?,” while the second bullet point in the same section simply states “By
comparing the handwriting of the lettering on the envelopes [containing the booklets] with R.’s personal
notes, a possible match of the [samples] should be worked out.”
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Figure 1.3

Radulovic’s sketch of the attic of his apartment, indicating where he stored notes and materials
gathered during his interviews with the punk-rockers not included in his booklet
On March 28, 1985, Radulovic was forced to create the above sketch during an interrogation in order for
the Stasi to gather potentially incriminating evidence from his apartment. This document demonstrates
that the MfS concerned itself not merely with the policing of GDR citizens, but also with the judiciary,
creating airtight cases that resulted in a courtroom filled primarily with show trials. Radulovic would later
go on to say that “In the beginning the court proceedings looked like they were governed by the rule of
law, like you naively imagine they would be. There was a state prosecutor, a judge, two lay judges. I had
a defence lawyer whom I could choose myself. But to put it bluntly, I could have picked a broom handle
to defend me, it would not have made any big difference.”97
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Figures 1.5 (left) and 1.6 (right)

Pages 1 and 2 of the Bildbericht (photo report) compiled for OPK “Schreiber”
English translations of the report (written in white textboxes and taken from “Looking in a Distorting
Mirror”), demonstrate the mundanity of the details collected by the Stasi about their targets. To the Stasi,
no piece of information about a target was trivial, but rather could be a necessary piece of evidence in
apprehending and/or convicting perceived enemies of the state for their supposed crimes. It is for this
detailed surveillance of GDR citizens that the MfS is remembered today, and was a fulfillment of the
former Minister to the MfS Erich Mielke’s demand that “Comrades, we must know everything.”98
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Figure 1.7

Chart data compiled from Jens Gieseke’s
The History of the Stasi: East Germany’s Secret Police, 1945-1990, p. 36-49
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Figure 1.8

Examples of Photos Taken by the Stasi During House Searches
Stasi agents took photos during break-ins primarily for two reasons. First, the Stasi could use these photos
as collected evidence to add to an individual’s file, or even to be used against an accused person in court.
Whenever the Stasi took Polaroid pictures, however, it was so they could move objects back to their
original place if they had been rearranged during apartment searches.
(Photos taken from p. 60 of Simon Menner’s Top Secret)
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Figure 1.9

Organization of the Ministry of State Security
Markus Wolf’s reconstruction of the MfS
(Chart taken from p. xv of Man Without a Face)
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